Water Markets in Georgia: An Overview of Ongoing Sales of Water by Phyllis Isley & Robert J. Middleton, Jr.
WATER MARKETS IN GEORGIA:
AN OVERVIEW OF ONGOING SALES OF WATER
Water Policy Working Paper #2003-006
Prepared by*
Professor Phyllis Isley




Robert J. Middleton, Jr.
Legal Consultant
Georgia Water Planning and Policy Center
Albany, GA
March, 2003
*The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support for this work provided by the Georgia Soil and Water
Conservation Commission (480-02-FR1001-2) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001-38869-10607-1).
WATER MARKETS IN GEORGIA:
AN OVERVIEW OF ONGOING SALES OF WATER
Abstract
This paper addresses considerations of direct relevance for ongoing debate in the state as
to whether or not water should be sold “like a commodity”.  The primary point made in the paper
is that water is and has long been bought and sold as a commodity in the state.  Thus, in the
author’s view the ongoing debate is simply out of touch with reality.  
This paper presents case studies showing that there are currently wholesale and retail
water markets in Georgia.   Moreover, such markets have benefitted many Georgians.  In each
case, the market in water was created in response to the need to support economic development
and lower customer’s costs.  These markets are subject to regulatory oversight, serve the interest
of rural communities, and work in concert with the object of planning and managing water
resources.
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WATER MARKETS IN GEORGIA:
 See, e.g., Cummings, R., A. Keeler, and B. Thompson, “Georgia Water - Public Resource or Commodity:1
What are the Real Policy Questions?” Water Policy Working Paper #2002-008, Coastal Rivers Water Planning and
Policy Center, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro (November, 2002)
 See Cummings, R., N. Norton and V. Norton, “Water Rights Transfers: Options for Institutional2
Reform,” Water Policy Working Paper #2001-001, Coastal Rivers Water Planning and Policy Center, Georgia
Southern University, Statesboro (September, 2001).
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AN OVERVIEW OF ONGOING SALES OF WATER
I.  Introduction
As the Georgia Legislature, during the 2003 session, considers means by which water
management in Georgia might be improved, there has been a great deal of controversy  centered1
on whether or not holders of state-issued water use permits in regions of the state with caps on
new permits should be able to sell such permits.  The rationale for such sales in regions with
caps on new permits is to allow patterns of water use to change over time in response to
opportunities for economic growth in the affected basin.    Further development of the water2
market in Georgia will promote the “highest and best use” of a valuable, yet limited resource. 
A curious aspect of the argument against such sales of water as “commodity” is that it
ignores the simple fact that water is and has for some time been effectively treated as a
commodity in Georgia, and it is bought and sold very much like other natural resource
commodities such as mining and petroleum resources.  Indeed, there now exists in Georgia both
wholesale and retail markets for water.  Moreover, ongoing water marketing in Georgia plays a
critically important role in smoothing out the allocation of water resources required to
accommodate rural economic growth and in increasing the cost effectiveness of municipal water
systems. And like the current market, further development of an expanded water market will be
subject to regulatory oversight by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD).
The purpose of this paper is to describe the current state of water marketing in the State
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of Georgia.  To this end, the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II the wholesale
market for water is examined.   The wholesale market consists largely of inter-municipal sales of
large volumes of water.  Two examples are discussed.  The first example of a wholesale water
market is the agreement by the City of Savannah to sell water to Effingham County.   Effingham
County in turn has an agreement to sell some of that water to the Effingham County Power
Company.  The second example is the inter-state sale of Georgia’s water by Columbus Water
Works to buyers in Alabama.  It is argued below that both of these examples illustrate how
markets flexibly allocate water resources to sustain growth and support economic development.
While not directly relevant for the trading of Georgia’s water and therefore not treated in
section II, we note as an aside that there are other examples of inter-state wholesale transactions
in water in Georgia including: 1) an inter-state sale where Rossville, GA, Dade and Walker
Counties, also in Georgia, buy water from the Tennessee-American Water Company (located in
Chattanooga, TN); and, 2) the purchase by Dalton Utilities of water from Eastside Utilities of
Tennessee.
In section III, attention is turned to a second, and perhaps more interesting market: the
retail water market.  The evolution of retail water marketing in Georgia is described, and the role
of this market in providing water to hundreds of thousands of Georgians living in rural areas is
discussed.  Given the importance of issues related to water rights to the retail water market, legal
principles or doctrines by which common property, like water, is made private property are also
discussed in this section.  Concluding remarks are offered in section IV.
II. Wholesale Water Transactions: Overcoming the Cap on Withdrawals
from the Floridan Aquifer 
  “Interim Strategy for Managing Saltwater Intrusion in the Upper Floridan Aquifer of Southeast Georgia,”3
Georgia Environmental Protection Division, April, 1997.
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A.  Intra-state sales of water.  A historically rural county, Effingham County is among the
fastest growing counties in Georgia.  Between 1999 and 2000 it ranked as the 22nd fastest
growing county in Georgia with an annual growth rate of 3.9%.  It grew at an average annual
rate of 4.6% between 1990 and 2000.  Located along the Savannah River adjacent to Chatham
County, the rapid population growth can be attributed to urban spillover from Chatham County. 
Springfield, population 2,651 in 2000, and Rincon, population 6,525 also in 2000, are the two
largest towns in the county.  With a total county population of 37,535, near 75% of the county’s
residents are rural.
The southern portion of Effingham County is included in the area to which restrictions
apply on new permits for the withdrawal of groundwater from the Upper Floridan Aquifer.   This3
cap prohibits cost effective development of groundwater as an option for sustaining growth in
the fastest growing portion of the county.  To overcome the potentially stifling effects on growth
created by the cap on permits for groundwater withdrawals in Effingham County, the County has
prepared and approved a local water management plan that includes provisions for the purchase
of water from the Savannah water system as a cost effective means by which it can accomplish
two purposes: provide potable water supplies for residents of Effingham County; and provide
water needed by Effingham County Power, LLC, a subsidiary of Progress Power, who plans to
construct a electric generating plant in the County. 
A brief examination of the agreements between Effingham County and Savannah serves
 “Water Agreement Between The City Of Savannah And The Effingham County Board Of4
Commissioners” and “Water Use Agreement Between The City Of Savannah, Effingham  County, and Effingham
County Power, LLC.
  Water Agreement, page 1.5
 Ibid., page 1.  To reduce demands on the groundwater in the region, the City of Savannah has developed a6
treatment plant for surface water drawn from the Savannah River.
 Ibid., page 7.  Emphasis added.7
 Ibid., pages 2 and 7.8
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two useful purposes.   First, they demonstrate how planning and markets work together to4
accomplish regulatory goals while providing water to high valued uses.  Second, they make clear
the fact that water is being traded as a commodity.  Reliance on markets as an integral part of the
local planning process is made manifest by language in the agreement between Effingham
County and Savannah that establishes the rationale for the agreement.  Examples include
provisions that: “...a regional approach to the management of water resources to achieve long-
term sustainable withdrawals from the Floridan Aquifer is in the best interest of all parties that
rely on this valuable natural resource.”   Emphasis on planning is seen in the agreement’s5
acknowledgment that  “Savannah has planned, for the long-term benefit of the region, the
development of alternative sources of potable water”.  6
The terms of the agreement between the City of Savannah, Effingham County and
Effingham County Power, LLC., include the following:
1.  Effingham County and Effingham County Power, LLC., will cooperate to
construct a 36 inch diameter water line from a point in Chatham County to the
planned Effingham County Power plant site which will be the delivery point for
water for both the plant and domestic customers in Effingham County;
2.  Effingham County will own and operate a water utility;
3.  Savannah shall sell, and Effingham shall purchase potable water  at a base wholesale7 8
rate of .67 the effective rate charged by Savannah to its retail customers on the outside-
There is a separate provision for the charge which will be assessed for the Capital Cost Recovery for9  
facilities Savannah developed to treat and filter surface water.  See Water Agreement, page 11.
 Effingham County Power has a reserve allocation above this of 7.0 MGD.  See, ”Water Use Agreement10
Contract No. XTB1000137.”
 The Water Use Agreement provides that Effingham County shall have the right to provide reuse water to11
Effingham County Power.  See, “Water Use Agreement Contract No. XTB1000137", Section II, B1-9.
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city rate;   9
4.  The quantity of First Tier Water is to be approximately 1.0 MGD   10 11
5.  The amount reserved to Effingham County may be increased by 12.5 MGD in
increments of 1.0 MGD; 
6.  Effingham will own and operate a water utility to serve Effingham County
Power, as a wholesale customer, and retail customers in the unincorporated areas
of Effingham County, and potentially the municipal water systems of the Cities of
Rincon, Springfield, and Guyton.
By any reading of the agreements between these three parties, water is being bought and
sold as a commodity.  The cap on new groundwater permits designed to reduce saltwater
intrusion in Coastal Georgia had the potential of stifling growth.  A wholesale market in water
created a win-win situation for two communities effected by the cap.  The City of Savannah is
able to spread the burden of the capital costs of the facilities for surface water treatment to more
users.  Effingham County obtains water to support continued growth through a planned, low cost
water supply option.
It should be clear from the above that planning and the market work hand-in-hand.  A
regional approach to water management created a basis for buyers and sellers to know each other
and the product alternatives.  Both parties, because of the planning process, had established a
mutual interest in achieving long-term sustainable withdrawals from the Floridian Aquifer. 
Further, information is often the most costly input in a market transaction.  The requirement that
local water supply plans include specific consideration of alternative sources for future water
  Until 2000, the Columbus Water Works sold water to Phenix City, AL in order to supply a large textile12
mill.  The mill has since gone out of business, but there are currently active negotiations for sale of this water to
other Alabama buyers including a second community within the Columbus, MSA.  The sensitivity of the
negotiations precludes detailed discussion of the proposed agreements, but it should be emphasized the Columbus
Water Works actively seeks customers in Alabama.  The authors gratefully acknowledge the generosity of Mr. Billy
Turner, President, Columbus Water Works, for time spent by him in helping the authors understand water supply
issues relevant for the Columbus area. .
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resulted in preparation and evaluation of information on the cost effectiveness of alternatives.
B.  Inter-state sales of water.  The sale of water by Columbus Water Works to customers
in Alabama is another example of how the rationality of the market place creates win-win
outcomes.   There are direct and indirect market forces supporting the rationality of selling12
Georgia’s water to customers in another state: economies of scale and economic development,
respectively.
The construction, expansion and improvement of water supply systems involves lumpy
capital investments.  Spreading the high cost of capital among as many potential users as
possible reduces the average cost of capital to all users.  This is simply what is referred to as
economies of scale.  More customers lower the average cost of building the necessary facilities
that benefit all customers.  By selling to consumers in Alabama, Alabama customers pay a share
of the cost of capital and Georgians pay less for municipal water services.
While reducing what Georgians must pay for water services is an important direct benefit
of the wholesale market in water, there are important indirect benefits that derive from this
example of water marketing.  These indirect benefits arise from growth in Columbus which is
the result of growth within the market area it serves -- growth that is supported by the
availability of reasonably priced water. 
Markets ignore geo-political boundaries.  Columbus, GA is a two state (Georgia and
  This was calculated using a modified version of Reilly’s Law.  See Bartolomei, Natalia and Mary13
Dowling.  “A New Look at an Old Formula: Reilly’s Law,” Southern Economic Developer, Spring, 2002, page 23.
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Alabama) Metropolitan Statistical Area, with a population of 224,868 in the 2000 census.  It is
estimated that the market area for the Columbus MSA, divided between Columbus, GA and
Montgomery, AL, extends into Alabama approximately 36 miles.   Economic development13
anywhere within its market area creates additional jobs and income in Columbus.  Supporting
the growth of jobs and income in adjacent Alabama supports, and grows, more jobs and income
in Columbus, Georgia.  Providing water for economic development anywhere within the sphere
of Columbus’s expanded market area increases economic opportunities for Georgians.
C.  Conclusions: Wholesale Water Markets.   Markets provide flexible solutions to meet
consumer demands.  Both of the wholesale water markets discussed above arose because local
conditions created an opportunity to support growth and economic development.  In the case of
Columbus, the need was to reinforce and capture the benefits of development within its market
area.  The result was lower cost of water services than would have otherwise been possible
without the market and the forces of economic development within the overall Columbus market
area.  In the case of Effingham County, there was a similar benefit to the City of Savannah in
that the cost of capital was shared among more users.  Additionally, Effingham County has been
able to continue to grow in spite of the EPD’s cap on new groundwater withdrawals in the
region.  The water market in Effingham in water provides a cost effective solution to minimize
the economic consequences in Effingham County of regulatory restrictions that could have
stifled growth -- regional cooperation with reliance on markets have had the effect of reducing
potential costs associated with EPD’s policies designed to protect the Upper Floridan Aquifer. 
The Safe Water Drinking Act was passed in 1974, amended in 1986 and 1996.14
 EPD’s regulations focus on consumer protection, requiring that: water meet certain quality standards;15
adequate amounts be provided to costumers, and that provisions are made to protect consumers in the case of
company failure for financial or other reasons.
 EPA, National Characteristics of Drinking Water Systems Serving Population Under 10,000, EPA -81616
R-99-010, July 1999.
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III.  The Retail Water Market in Georgia
A.  Overview.   In this section we describe the evolution of retail water markets in
Georgia.  These markets involve Public Water Systems and Community Water Systems.  As we
will demonstrate, these retail water marketing institutions have developed in response to the
needs of primarily rural communities in the state.  These developments are considered below in
sub-section B.  A somewhat peripheral but important issue is taken up in sub-section C for the
purpose of providing the reader with a more comprehensive appreciation for the development of
retail water markets in Georgia.  This issue centers on the extent to which property rights related
to water are clearly defined -- an essential prerequisite for the effective operation of any private
market. 
B. The evolving, private retail market for water in Georgia.  The provision of drinking
water is regulated nationally by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,  and in Georgia by14
the State’s Environmental Protection Division.   The regulations cover two types of water15
systems: Public Water Systems (PWS); and Community Water Systems (CWS).   A PWS serves
at least 15 connections or regularly provides water for human consumption to at least 25 persons
daily, for at least 60 days per year.  A Community Water System (CWS), which is a sub-set of
PWS, has at least 15 service connections used by year-round residents or regularly serves at least
25 year-round residents.  As of July 1999, there were 180,364 PWS in the U.S., 50,289 (28%) of
which were CWS, serving 243 million people.    16
 See www.state.ga.us/dnr/environ/regcomm_files/wrb/webpws.   17
 Derived through a query of the www.state.ga.us/dnr/environ/regcomm_files/wrb/webpws.  CRWPPC is18
currently conducting a survey of the identified businesses.  One of the questions asked of the businesses is the
identify of the primary competitors.  This is an effort to identify other firms which may not have emerged through
the query.
 The multiple county definition was employed to differentiate between holders of multiple permits where19
the permits actually applied to sequential of sub-division of the same parcel of land.  
 See EPD, CWS permit file 147009.20
 See Coastal Water & Sewer Co., LLC., South Atlantic Utilities, Inc., or Sunbelt Utilities, Inc.21
  In Coastal Georgia significant concentrations of private sector CWS ownership are: Bulloch; Chatham;22
Effingham;  and Camden Counties.  In south central Georgia significant activity occurs around Lowdens County.  In
south west Georgia significant private development of public systems around Dougherty and Thomas and Brooks.
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In Georgia, there are 2,553 PWS listed on the Georgia EDP website.   Of these, 1,67317
are CWS, serving the rural water needs of more than 678,000 Georgians.  1,074 (64%) of
Georgia’s CWS are privately owned, small, public water systems.  The balance, or 599 CWS, are
owned and operated by small, rural municipalities.  Of the 1,074 privately owned CWS most are
owned by sole proprietors, owning only one system.  However, at least 14 companies have
developed portfolios of systems with holding in multiple counties.     These 14 companies18 19
include at least one South Carolina company with a portfolio of 25 systems in 7 southwest
Georgia Counties.   Inspection permit applications held by the EPD indicate that firms
specializing in CWS emerged in two ways.  First, some of the firms began to specialize in the
business of CWS because they were drillers who evolved into operators as systems became more
regulated.   On the other hand, some firms specialized in the business of CWS because they20
have the necessary expertise with respect to the regulatory process required to obtain a permit.21
Firms specializing in the CWS business are generally concentrated in the fast growing
regions of Coastal Georgia and to a more limited extent around small and mid-sized cities in
rural south central and south west Georgia.   Population growth in rural Georgia clusters around22
small cities.  In many cases the small cities, surrounding larger urban areas, are the municipal
 We find but one CWS in the EPD data base that appears to rely on surface water.23
 In our discussions of retail water markets in Georgia, we note that it might be argued that the bulk of the24
price charged for water is payment for the cost of operations and overhead, not water, in which case it is not really
water that is being marketed, but more or less the services of capital.  This line of argument is belied by at least two
examples related to fugitive property (discussed in detail below).  In Pierson v. Post [3 Cal. R. 172, R. Am. Dec.
264 (Supreme Court of New York, 1805)] the fugitive property in questions was a fox.  At the time foxes had a
market price, a bounty which was paid in order to encourage eradication, but the price paid for the fox by the
bounty hunter was the cost of its capture.  The fact that virtually all costs were associated with “capture” was not
taken by the court as minimizing private property interest in the fox.  Similarly, as noted above, the activities of
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operators of small CWS.  The limited size and scale of these systems often means that it is cost
prohibitive to expand to accommodate incremental demands for water supply.  Further, in the
public arena where the decision about incurring the cost to extend a municipal system is made,
future residents are not represented.  Hence, the public sector’s response to potential growth is
inadequate.  The private sector has exploited the opportunity to grow the water market created to
some extent by the public sector’s failure to meet growth needs.  Where the pace of this grow is
very high, there is sufficient density in the market for firms specializing in CWS to emerge.
The predominantly privately-owned CWS play an important role in Georgia’s rural areas. 
They lower the cost of housing in areas where municipal services are not available.  The lower
cost is the result of the increased development densities which a CWS supports relative to
development of individual water supplies through individual wells on a given parcel without a
CWS.  Moreover, the private sector portion of the market has responded more rapidly than the
public sector to accommodate growth in communities surrounding center of growth in rural
Georgia.  
Finally, it is worth noting that CWS are most comparable to mining operations for oil or
gas.  The vast majority of CWS rely on groundwater.   CWS firms develop or own wells and23
pumping systems to extract groundwater, with on-site facilities for process, in ways that directly
parallel oil and gas extraction operations.24
firms operating CWS resemble production processes in the mining of oil and gas.  Like the case of the fox, the bulk
of the price of natural gas or oil or water is the cost associated with drilling, capturing, processing and delivering the
product.  However, since ownership of natural gas, oil or water comes from ownership of land, some small part of
the price for water is also payment for the real property attached to the fugitive settled property.  All of this is to
make clear that in the market for water, the consumer ultimately pays all costs: 1) the cost of the water; and, 2) the
cost of its capture and delivery.
 See Irwin v Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, (Supreme Court of California, 1855), qui prior est tempore, potior est in25
jure.
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C. Issues related to property rights.  At issue in this sub-section is the nature of property
rights that privately-owned CSW have in the groundwater resources that are extracted by them
and then sold to the public.  Basic to this issue are laws related to what is referred to as “fugitive
property.”
The common law recognizes a class of property called fugitive property.  Fugitive
property is no one’s property until possessed.  Most common property resource are fugitive
property.  Examples of such resources are: groundwater, wild animals, natural gas, oil, and air. 
Two separate legal rules for assigning ownership rights to fugitive property have evolved.  One
property rule applied to fugitive property is the right of first possession.   In western water law
the right of first possession has become known as the doctrine of prior appropriations.   25
The second property rule used to regulate conflicting claims of ownership of fugitive property 
ties entitlement to exploit fugitive property to other “settled” property rights.  The owners of
certain types of private property have the right to use and prevent others from using the fugitive
property “tied to” other settled private property.  Owners of property to which the right to use
fugitive property attaches only have to establish dominion over the property for it to become
their private property.  For example, the riparian water rights doctrine ties the right to use the
water of a stream to ownership of the land through which the stream flows.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both rules.  For example, it is argued that the
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rule of first possession or prior appropriation is a relatively inexpensive and easily observable
means of determining ownership claims.  However, even in very early fugitive property cases
such as Pierson v. Post 3 Cal. R. 172, R. Am. Dec. 264 (Supreme Court of New York, 1805)
where the fugitive property in question was a fox, the flaw in the rule of first possession is the
center of the argument: when and who actually first established dominion over the fugitive
object.  The rule leaves a gap in ownership, because the fugitive object is no one’s property until
it is actually possessed.  The economic consequence of the rule of first possession is over
investment in the capture of fugitive objects in order to establish ownership and pre-empt
ownership by others.  The result is over harvesting and monopoly-like control over the resource
aimed at acquiring potential speculative gains.  This reallocates wealth, but does not create
wealth, e.g. economic development.
The advantage of tying ownership of fugitive objects to ownership of easily observable
settled property is that there is no gap in ownership.  However, it is argued that this rule has the
disadvantage that it is difficult and costly to administer because it can be difficult to establish
that the fugitive object, by definition an object that moves, attaches to the settled property.  This
was the point at issue in Hammonds v Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky.685, 75
S.W.2d 204 (Circuit of Appeals of Kentucky, 1934) and Stoner v. Patten, 132, Ga 178 (1909). 
In Stoner, the Georgia Supreme Court held that non-malicious interference with underground
waters is non-actionable unless the waters are part of a stream which “is well defined and its
existence known or easily discernable,” a nearly impossible burden placed on the person
claiming that his or her underground water supply is being depleted.
 Gould, George A. and Douglas L. Grant, Cases and Materials on Water Law, 6th Ed., West Group26
Publishing Company (St. Paul: 2000)
 Ibid., page 326-327 for a description of Absolute Ownership.27
 Bomar, Robert S.  “Georgia Water Law and Existing and Potential Water Conflicts,” CLE International.28
 Ibid., page 330-331 for a description of Absolute Ownership.29
 Bomar, Robert S. “Georgia Water Law and Existing and Potential Water Conflicts,” CLE International,30
Water Law, April 22-23, 2002.
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Rights to groundwater are not always treated the same as surface water rights.   It is26
argued that Georgia applies a Modified Absolute Ownership  rule with respect to the property27
rights a surface owner may assert over groundwater.   As to surface waters, Georgia applies the28
doctrine of reasonable use to a riparian owner’s right to use water in streams flowing through the
owner’s land. Prince v. Hugh Schools Manufacturing Co. 132 Ga. 248 (1909); Pyle v. Gilbert
245 Ga. 403 (1980); O.C.G.A. ' 44-8-1 and ' 51-9-7. For groundwater, Stoner v. Paton, discussed
above, and subsequent cases applying Stoner, developed Georgia case law effectively allowing
the application of a modified absolute ownership rule   “the owner of realty owns the property29
upwards and downwards indefinitely.” Georgia did, however, depart from a pure modified
absolute ownership doctrine in passage of the Ground-water Use Act of 1972, O.C.G.A. ' 12-5-
90 et seq. Under the Act, persons withdrawing over 100,000 gallons of groundwater per day are
subject to certain permitting requirements, sometimes referred to regulated reasonable use.30
The right to exploit groundwater is ultimately attached to the ownership of the land which
overlays the water.   Resources like natural gas, oil and water are fugitive property resources
which become private property through the diligence of an effort to possess.  A sole proprietor or
other business owning a CWS may, subject to meeting legal and regulatory requirements,
maintain ownership rights under Georgia law, discussed above, so as to allow them to  capture




The oft-heard question “are Georgia’s waters a public resource or a commodity to be
bought and sold?” is misleading and out of touch with reality Georgia: water is and has been
bought and sold as a commodity.  Moreover, this reality has, in large part, benefitted many
Georgians.  
Water markets have generally developed in the past on a “piecemeal,” or case-by-case
basis. Recent decreases in water supply due to drought, other factors, coupled with increasing
water needs for growth and economic development and the concomitant value placed on water
supply, supports the need to “codify,” so to speak, past water market principles. As the
Legislature considers legislation to create up to date additional regulatory frameworks to expand
water rights transfers, a more mature water market will be promoted. 
This paper has presented case studies showing that there are currently wholesale and
retail water markets in Georgia.  In each case, the water market was created in response to needs
supporting economic development and the reduction of consumer’s costs.  These markets
promote the interest of rural communities and work in concert with the object of planning and
managing water resources.
